I'm never quite sure how seriously to take the 'strong' version of the thesis that the way our language is structured conditions our conceptual view of the world. This takes us towards 'language equals thought' (as opposed to the other end of the argument 'language and thought are totally separate entities with one being dependent on the other'
. David Crystal in the 1987 edition of the Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Language (there's a more up to date version I'm sure) says "the truth seems to lie somewhere between these two positions" (!).
It's a big debate, and I haven't checked out the latest thinking on it since I quit teaching (Deo Gratias!)and took up heather burning. But structural anthropolgists like Levi-Strauss and post-structuralists like Derrida have all had a go.
Famously, 'linguistic determinism' was associated with the 'Sapir-Whorf'.
hypothesis, predicated on a few languages -Hopi in particular. Crystal, in 1987, went on to say: "... in its strongest form it is unlikely to have many adherents now".
Any different views out there? Especially on the number of Inuit words for snow? In English we can manage sleet, slush, snow ... any more? Three English seems to me to show that none of this signifies very much at all. And if you don't have a word for something - you can still grasp the concept, perhaps through circomlocution ('falling snow' - 'snow that fell yesterday/on my budgie's birthday etc'
Jim
<Added>oops, 'circumlocution' not 'circomlocution' (which is Martian, and signifies "a shallow hole in which ants live").